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ABSTRACT 
Russia' s renewal since the collapse of communism has proved extraordinarily 
difficult and uneven. While the political dimension of post-Soviet reform has for the 
most part succeeded, the economic aspect of the reform has failed . This project argues 
that the radical economic reform carried out by the Yeltsin government was doomed to 
failure, because the design of the reform was unsuitable, and its implementation 
unsatisfactory. The central thesis of this project is that Russia had no institutional 
preparation for a rapid transition to a market economy of liberal orientation; a wrong 
policy choice has been the main reason for the unsuccessful outcome of Russian 
economic reform. 
To analyze the issue ofRussian post-communist reform and its outcomes, this 
project uses the case study method. The paper critiques the "shock therapy" approach as 
a strategy of economic transformation and suggests an alternative set of policy options 
based on gradualism and social-democratic values, arguing that the latter strategy holds a 
better prospect of generating sustainable economic growth. 
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{The} reform secured macroeconomic change, name~y the destruction of the old economy. It 
was a wildly painful break, surgically crude, with the rusty grinding sound of pieces of old 
parts and mechanisms being ripped out together with the flesh ... .[That economy's} make-up 
dictated precisely that sort of a break: over the knee. 
-Boris Yeltsin 1 
Sudden action is f or those who do not themselves suffer, do not think before acting, 
who proceed by f ormula, not fact. Only if time is allowed can there be time for 
thought- the thought that is attuned to pragmatic result and not to primitive ideology. 
-John Galbraith2 
1. Introduction 
It appears that most observers agree on the outcomes of the first decade of economic 
reform in post-Soviet Russia, outcomes that could be rather effectively summarized by a 
single word - failure. The above results can also be easily summarized in one sentence: 
"during the twentieth century, no country in the world suffered in peacetime such an 
economic disaster as did Russia in the 1990s."3 The economic and social crisis went far 
beyond any reasonable expectations in regard to the levels of anticipated transitional 
recession. What is much less clear from the diverse literature on Russian transition is 
what might have been the causes explaining the above results, and what lessons are to be 
drawn from the experience. 
As Job4 shows, two models of explanation emerge from the mainstream economic 
analysis of post-communist Russia. According to the first way of explaining the 
situation, no extraordinary events have happened in the country; the road to the market 
1 Boris Yeltsin as cited in Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1996) 23 1. 
2 John Galbraith as cited in Peter Nolan, China ' s Rise. Russia's Fall : Politics, Economics and Planning in the 
Transition from Stalinism (New York: St. Martin ·s Press, 1995) 57. 
3 Oleg Bogomolov, "Russia Facing the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," lntemational Social Science Joumal, 
Vol. 52 Issue 163 (March 2000): 95. 
4 Sebastian Job, "Globalizing Russia? The Neoliberal/Nationalist Two-Step,'' '111ird World Quarterly, Vol 22, N. 
6(2001 ) 931-947. 
goes naturally through economic depression and social instability, difficulties that are 
only temporary "potholes" on the road to the market. In other words, within this 
"minimizing theory" framework, both economic and social costs are seen as a necessary 
price to pay for the opportunity of switching to the free market economic arrangement; 
the burdens of the reforms are to be borne for the sake of inevitable success. 
Another theory explaining the difficulties of the transition is that ofRussian 
"exceptionality" or backwardness. According to this school of thought, it is historical, 
cultural, and national peculiarities that explain the failure of economic reform in the 
Russian context; it was the lack of democratic tradition, the lack of understanding of the 
market's basics, the lack of an appropriate work ethic, the lack of the rule of the law, etc., 
that determined the post-Soviet failure. This emphasis on Russian exceptionalism, 
although having some merit, can nonetheless be seen for the most part as an effort to 
avoid any serious questioning ofthe nee-liberal formula for reform.5 
This essay will argue that the failure of Russian economic reform cannot be 
adequately explained by either of the above theories; instead, it is the structural 
adjustment policies within the larger framework of the nee-liberal development strategy 
adopted by the Russian government in 1991-1992 that lie at the core of the country ' s 
unprecedented economic and social decline. Another major separate factor in Russia' s 
fall has been the country' s incompetent and often self-interested political elite and its 
uncritical and doctrinaire adoption of liberal policies combined with its surrender to the 
pressures from oligarchic groups.6 
Were there any feasible alternatives to the radical economic model adopted by the 
5 Job 932. 
6 Sergey Braguinsky and Grigory Yavlinsky, Incentives and Institutions: the Transition to a Market Economy in Russia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 200. 
2 
Russian administration in 1992? Another argument advanced in this paper is that it is not 
the neo-liberal, but the social-democratic path that the Russian administration should 
have chosen at that time. It would have been easier to move from state socialism to a 
socially-oriented mixed economy - most elements of institutional infrastructure of social 
democracy were already in place; there was no need to dismantle them. 7 
Finally, is there any place for an alternative strategy for contemporary Russia? 
While the social-democratic alternative remains a strategy that would be the most 
beneficial to the vast majority ofthe country' s population, both the institutional capacity 
and the economic ability to support a welfare state have been seriously weakened. Thus, 
at this stage, a welfare state with full employment with free health care and education is 
simply unaffordable and out of reach. This does not mean, however, that no elements of 
a progressive economic program of modernization and development can be adopted at 
this time. If the recent trends of economic and social degradation are to be overcome and 
reversed, it is essential that efforts are made to develop and promote a reasonable 
economic strategy appropriate to Russian conditions, a strategy that would produce 
growth without disrupting social stability. This strategy, while accepting the market 
system as the best way of organizing the production of goods and services, will aim to 
use state institutions to ensure that the benefits of this system are distributed in a way that 
ensures the maximum benefit for all groups of society. This progressive strategy of 
social-democratic orientation would call for finding a new, country-specific balance 
between the free market and state regulation, and would call for the state becoming more 
active, efficient, and predictable while less bureaucratic. 
To analyze the issue of the Russian post-communist reform and its outcomes, this 
7 
Bertram Silverman and Murray Y anowich, New Rich, New Poor, New Russia (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000) 25. 
3 
project uses the case study method and more specifically a process study research design 
in terms of Louise White' s classification of case studies;8 this type of research design is 
commonly used in examining public policies.9 The case study investigates the following 
two propositions: (1) an inappropriate economic development strategy has been adopted 
by the Russian government which has resulted in economic and social decline on a large 
scale; (2) the country could have done better had it chosen to pursue socially oriented, 
incremental market reforms of socio-democratic orientation. 
The first part of this project will examine the neoliberal economic reform adopted 
by the Russian government in 1991-1992, focusing on implemented policies and their 
immediate effects and long-term outcomes. The second part will suggest and analyze the 
reasons for the failure of post-communist reform. The final section will discuss the 
elements of a transition to a socially oriented market economy and offer some alternative 
policy proposals. 
2. Economic reform and its outcomes 
Perhaps the best way to approach the task of analyzing Russian post-communist reform 
would be to look at the process in a historical perspective, starting with the policies 
introduced by the Gorbachev administration in 1986 followed by the strategy adopted in 
1991 by the Russian government led by Yeltsin. In this section we will also consider the 
policies implemented in 1991-1992 within the framework of radical economic reform, 
and their immediate and long-term outcomes. 
8 Louise G. White, Political Analysis: Technique and Practice (Fort Worth : Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1999) 
101-121. 
9 White 118. 
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2.1. Evolution of economic reform 
Soviet socialism never found an effective economic policy; the Soviet system stormed 
into the industrial age but failed to respond to the challenges of post-industrialism. 10 As a 
result, starting in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union had been increasingly lagging behind 
the leading Western countries in regard to all the major economic indicators; by the mid-
1980s, it became obvious that the Soviet administrative-command system was no longer 
capable of producing the results necessary for adequate economic development.'' The 
Soviet centrally-planned economy failed for three major reasons: central planning 
required an enormous amount of information, which was not always available and was 
often out of date; a supply-dominated economy had a built-in tendency to supply what the 
centre wanted to supply, rather than what consumers would prefer; and finally, the 
operation of the planned economic system did not reflect relative scarcities, making 
optimum economic decision-making impossible. 12 Reform ofthe country's economic 
institutions was therefore both necessary and inevitable, even though the situation in the 
early and mid-1980s can best be described as that of stagnation rather than of economic 
decline.13 
The reforms instituted by Gorbachev in the late 1980s could be viewed as a 
response to the crisis of an administrative-command economy managed from the centre. 
These reforms could be summarized as follows : the growth and legitimating of market 
transactions; an increase in private and cooperative trade; a greater authority given to 
production units; adoption of the accounting principle of khozraschet whereby units had 
10 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1996) 231 . 
11 Anders As lund, How Russia Became a Market Economy, (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995) 41-
50. 
12 David Lane, The Rise and Fall of State Socialism (Cambridge: Policy Press, 1996) 101. 
13 Nolan 40, 303, 304; Marie Lavigne, The Economics of Transition: From Socialist Economy to Market Economy (St. 
Martin ' s Press: NewYork, 1999) 45 . 
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to balance their income and expenditure; and the reduction of the central bureaucracy 
while giving greater autonomy to the republics.14 The new economic model proposed by 
Gorbachev and his advisers not only rejected the bureaucratic command structure in 
favour of the market; it also abandoned the assumption that state ownership was the only 
acceptable form of common ownership, adding new forms of cooperative and individual 
ownership. 
How much should have been planned by the state, and how much left to the 
market, according to Gorbachev' s economic paradigm? While Gorbachev and his 
administration rejected the extreme ideas of nee-liberal economics, including proposals 
to close down all loss-making farms immediately and let prices rise until supply equals 
demand, he did not commit himself to the continuation of direct administration of 
production and investment by the state.15 Thus, he pointed out that the state management 
... will be freed from the functions of direct interference in the operational administration 
of economic units and concentrated on the establishment of general normative frameworks 
and conditions for their activity. Its natural spheres will remain: the key directions of 
scientific and technical progress; the infrastructure; the defense of the environment; 
securing that people are adequately supported socially; the financial system, including its 
instruments of taxation; and economic legislation, including legislation against monopoly 
and its negative consequences for society.16 
It is evident that Gorbachev and the moderate reformers around him were aiming at a 
democratic, politically pluralist form of social democracy with a mixed economy, a J 
strategy that has had a reasonable potential for producing growth without disrupting 
social stability. However, in the Russia ofthe late 1980s- early 1990s, there was another 
political power centre: most of the ruling party-state elite of the Russian Federation, 
influenced by the radical version of liberal economic theory and often motivated by their 
desire to achieve the prosperity of its Western counterparts, became the centre of a 
14 Lane 107. 
15 Davies, R.W. , "Gorbachev' s Socialism in Historical Perspective," New Left Review 179 (1990) 14. 
16 Davies 15 . 
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coalition led by Y eltsin. 17 
Radical reformists became the chief beneficiaries of the August 1991 coup 
attempt; after this, Y eltsin and his group emerged with increased legitimacy and with 
almost no opposition. Shortly thereafter, the Yeltsin administration rejected an economic 
platform that favored an industrial policy and which was designed by an alternative group 
of his advisers along the lines of the "Asian economic model." 18 Instead, Y eltsin made 
his choice in favour of an economic strategy put forward by radical reformers (the 
Burbuilis-Gaidar group), whose Western inspiration was the Thatcher-Reagan revolution 
and who favored the almost complete dismantling of government economic controls. 19 
While at least twelve alternative programs for the reform of the Soviet economy were 
advanced by both Russian and Western economists between 1989 and 1991/0 the final 
choice was made in the favour of radical "economic medicine" -that of shock therapy. 
The discussion of the choices made by the Russian administration would not be 
complete without acknowledging the enormous challenges the reformers were facing. 
The task was no less than that of replacing the disintegrating state-controlled economy 
with a modern mixed economy. There was no relevant precedent, theory, or experience 
that could help in guiding the reformers through this uncharted territory21 - and yet they 
had to enter it. Another important factor that influenced the choice of reform strategy 
was the assumed political threat of a return to communism and to central planning in 
particular.22 The collapse of both the USSR and the Communist Party was seen as a 
17 David Kotz and Fred Weir, Revolution From Above: The Demise of the Soviet System (New York: Routledge, 
1997). 
18 Jerry Hough, The Logic of Economic Reform in Russia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) 131. 
19 Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia' s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy 
(Washington, D .C. : United States Institute ofPeace Press, 2001) 269. 
20 Reddaway and Glinski 269. 
21 Gail W. Lapidus, The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) 39. 
22 Peter Rutland, "The Rocky Road from Plan to Market", in Stephen White et al., eds., Developments in Russian 




unique window of opportunity to introduce radical economic reform. 23 Many reformers 
believed that there was no real alternative to a radical strategy of economic 
transformation. Thus, Aslund, who served as an economic advisor to the Russian 
government at the time, writes: 
Under the circumstances prevailing in Russia in late 1991, it would have been lethal to 
hesitate or move slowly .... the real implication of compromise would be to surrender power 
to the old antidemocratic establishment. ... the more radical the liberalization, the sooner 
markets will be cleansed of distortions and corruption? 4 
While some observers25 argued that the radical approach to economic reform was the only 
option in late 1991, and saw shock therapy as the only bridge from communism to 
capitalism, others26 suggested that there were alternatives to radical reform strategy at that 
time, and that shock therapy was not the most feasible approach to the transitional 
challenge. Thus, according to Reddaway and Glinski, 
... we interpret shock therapy ... as a politically conservative counter-reform designed ... to weaken 
the potential for the continuation of the democratic revolution .... Before the beginning of shock 
therapy, Yeltsin and his associates possessed a number of alternative possibilities for leading 
Russian society out of its historical impasse. The effect of shock therapy has been to complicate or 
even to foreclose those altematives.27 
On a theoretical level, the merits of radical economic reform and shock therapy as a 
strategy of economic transformation were extensively debated by two prominent 
specialists on Soviet and East European economics, Brada and Murrell/8 the two 
contrasting perspectives were further assessed in detail by Hall and Elliot.29 
While the debate between the proponents and opponents of the shock therapy 
approach is an ongoing one, the analysis presented in this project is sympathetic to the 
23 Rutland 149. 
24 AslWld 10-11. 
25 See, for example, AslWld, Sachs, Brady. 
26 See, for example, Nolan, Stiglitz, Silverman and Yanowitch. 
27 Reddaway and Glinski 256, 308. 
28 Josef C. Brada, "The Transformation from Communism to Capitalism: How Far? How Fast?" Post-Soviet Affairs 
( 1993/9/2): 87-11 0; Peter Murrell, "What is Shock Thempy? What Did it Do in Poland and Russia?" Post-Soviet 
Affairs (1993/9/2): 111-140. 
29 Thomas W. Hall and John E. Elliot, "Poland and Russia One Decade After Shock Therapy", Journal of Economic 
Issues (JWle 1999): 305-315. 
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perspective of those30 advocating a gradualist, evolutionary approach with a social-
democratic orientation. The following argument put forward by the opponents of radical 
economic reform seems to be a valid one: in the autumn of 1991, six years since the 
democratization process had been initiated by Gorbachev, and in a situation where both 
the USSR and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had collapsed, the real choice for 
the Russian administration and the society as a whole was not about whether or not to 
move from socialism to capitalism - this choice had already been made - but rather about 
how to move to the market_31 It could be reasonably argued that in late 1991, while the 
policy choices were indeed considerably constrained by the scope of the challenges the 
reformers were facing, these choices nevertheless were not limited to radical economic 
strategy alone. 
Despite the alternatives available, on October 28, 1991, a speech was made by 
Yeltsin where the main theme was his commitment to radical economic reform, 
represented by a strategy with the basic elements of stabilization, liberalization, and 
privatization, also known as the "Washington consensus" package. 32 According to 
Reddaway and Glinski, " ... [ f]or the Russian parliament, unsophisticated in economics, 
the confident tone and the reassuring promises [ofthe speech] relieved some oftheir 
main worries,"33 and on November 1, 1991, the parliament voted to grant Yeltsin 
additional powers to carry out the reforms. Two months later, Russia' s road to the 
market began with a vigorous "big bang," better known as the "shock therapy" approach. 
30 See, for example, Cohen and Schwartz, Silverman and Yanowitch, Reddaway and Glinski, Job, and Bogomolov. 
31 Reddaway and Glinski 243. 
32 Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 106. 
33 Reddaway and Glinski 279. 
9 
2. 2. Elements of economic reform: policies and their direct effects 
At a meeting ofthe G-7 in Houston in 1990, participants requested that the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development carry 
out a study of the Soviet economy and to outline recommendations for reforms. A 
number of Soviet economic and financial agencies also worked on the project. The 
report' s proposed radical-liberal model of market reform had been rejected by 
Gorbachev' s administration but later was adopted as a guide for the transformation of the 
Russian economy by Yeltsin's administration despite warnings about potentially 
dangerous consequences of the "shock therapy" approach.34 The essence of the reform 
can be best described by referring to its three main components: macroeconomic 
stabilization; abolition of price controls and liberalization of domestic and foreign trade; 
and privatization. 35 
Macroeconomic stabilization implied a package of measures aimed at the 
establishment of a stable, convertible currency combined with policies to control 
inflation. These measures and policies included tight monetary and credit policy, 
attracting international financing by utilizing foreign credit, making cuts in government 
spending, balancing the government budget, and re-organizing the financial system 
through reform of the tax and banking systems. 36 
The second element of radical economic reform, liberalization, included abolition 
of price controls through the elimination of subsidies to consumer and producer goods, 
services, and labour. 37 While a few basic commodities were excluded from price 
liberalization, 90 percent of consumer prices and 80 percent of producer prices were freed 
~ogomolov 98. 
35 Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 106-108. 
36 Sakwa 235. 
37 Aslund 140. 
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immediately after the policy of price liberalization took effect on January 2, 1992.38 The 
reformers were apparently convinced that a swift, comprehensive liberalization of prices 
was a necessary pre-condition for the success of the transition. 39 In addition to price 
liberalization, the second component ofthe economic reform package included 
liberalization of foreign trade through the lifting of export and import licenses and 
quantative restrictions, lowering of tariffs, devaluation of domestic currency and making 
it convertible on the current account. All enterprises were given the freedom to engage in 
foreign trade.40 Liberalization of foreign trade took effect along with the liberalization of 
domestic trade, which included the freedom to establish enterprises, to engage in trade 
and production, and to determine prices on goods and services offered to consumer. 41 
The final element of the radical economic reform was that of the privatization of 
the state-owned enterprises. The purpose of privatization was to transform enterprises 
into self-financing units, which could then be regulated by financial, fiscal and monetary 
means that would replace the administrative-command methods of control. It was 
assumed that the private sector of the economy in most cases would immediately become 
more efficient than the state-owned sector.42 
Small and medium-sized enterprises were privatized either through tender offers 
or auction; large enterprises initially were meant to be privatized through voucher 
schemes, though exceptions were made to this rule, including the "loans-for-shares" 
privatization scheme discussed later. Privatization was the key part of the radical 
structural reform package and it was carried out at high speed. According to Richard 
38 Aslund 139. 
39 Aslund 139. 
40 Aslund 145-149 
41 Aslund 139. 
42 David Lane, Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatization and Inequality (London and New York: Longman, 1995) 
145-157. 
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Layard, advisor to the Russian government, the privatization program produced the 
"fastest rate of privatization in human history, in which in one month the Russian 
government is privatizing more than Mrs. Thatcher did in ten years."43 Already by the 
end of 1994, 70 percent of state property had been transferred to private hands and 70 
percent of all workers were working in the private sector.44 
The above strategy, proposed within the framework of the radical structural 
reform package, could be briefly summarized as follows: cut government expenditures 
and eliminate the budget deficit, raise all prices to free-market levels, privatize most state 
enterprises, and economic growth will follow. Let us now consider some direct 
macroeconomic effects of the structural adjustment strategy adopted in Russia in 1991 45 . 
2.2.1. Macroeconomic stabilization 
As we have seen, the policies of macroeconomic stabilization involved a budget deficit 
reduction and strict limitations on credit and money supply. The inflationary spiral had 
to be kept under control, the current account balance had to be improved, and the 
government deficit had to be eliminated. If growth was to be resumed, it was important 
at the time to mobilize domestic savings in order to be able to pursue development-
oriented policies.46 
The macroeconomic stabilization program had some positive effects. Direct 
subsidies from the government to enterprises were abolished, and the government was 
largely able to keep its budget deficit and the money supply under control. Much more 
43 Richard Layard as cited in Nolan, 276; emphasis in original. 
44 Nolan 276. 
45 Although the focus of the following section primarily is on the immediate and medium-term macroeconomic effects, 
occasionally it will be necessary to refer to a longer timeframe of up to seven years. 
46 Luiz Carlos Pereira, Jose M. Maravall and Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democratics: A Social-
Democratic Approach. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 8. 
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attention was now being paid by the managers of newly privatized enterprises to the costs 
and the quality of supplies, and to the marketing of products and services. 47 However, the 
adopted measures also produced a number of negative effects actually hindering the 
transition to a market economy in very important respects. Thus, the share of loss-
making firms increased from about 7 percent in 1992 to almost 50 percent in 1997. With 
that, a large number of unprofitable enterprises have stopped paying both taxes and 
wages.48 Another effect ofthe Yeltsin-IMF program was money becoming so scarce that 
more than half of the economic transactions had to be conducted through barter. 
According to Braginsky and Yavlinsky' s analysis, the share of non-monetary settlements 
rose from 6 percent in 1992 to 41 percent during the first half of 1997; another estimate 
suggests that share could have been as high as 70 percent by the end of 1997.49 The main 
result of the above once again has been a sharp drop in tax revenue. 
Macroeconomic stabilization has also failed in its anti-inflationary aspect. With 
the initiation of the policy of structural adjustment, the official rate of the rouble50 to the 
dollar began to fall dramatically: if by the summer of 1991 , the rate was approximately 
25 roubles to the dollar, by December 1992 it had reached 400 roubles to the dollar and 
by October of 1994, it was 3,926 roubles to a dollar. It follows that anyone- and that 
includes the majority of country' s population - who held their savings in roubles in 1991 
had the value of their savings drastically reduced and often eliminated. 51 The table below 
shows both the immediate and long-term outcomes in respect to the levels of inflation: 
while these levels were the most pronounced in 1992 and 1993, a rate of inflation was 
47 Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 109-110. 
48 Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 111. 
49 Braginsky and Yavlinsky 112. 
50 A unit of Russian currency. 
51 Bartlorniej Kaminski, ed. Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (London: M. E. Sharpe, 
1996) 232. 
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standing at over 400 percent per annum on average during the first seven years of reform. 
1992 1993 1994 
1,354 896 220 
Table 1. Inflation, 1992- 1998 










Sources: adapted from Reddaway and Glinski, "The Tragedy of Russia's Reforrns"(2001) p.249; OECD Publications, "The Social 
Crisis in Russian Federation" (2001) p.34. 
Although Gaidar, one of the main ideologues of radical reform, predicted that 
stabilization would take place within a year from the moment of the initiation of shock 
therapy, it was not until 1999 that Russia finally achieved a limited degree of 
"macroeconomic stabilization. " 52 
2. 2. 2. Abolition of price controls and liberalization of trade 
The abrupt removal of price controls, while indeed balancing short-term supply and 
demand and overcoming shortages ofbasic supplies, led to a significant increase in retail 
prices: 53 within a few days of lifting state controls over retail prices the latter rose by 3 00-
500 per cent, which resulted in a drastic fall in real consumption. 54 Within a year, the 
price of bread, for example, increased by more than a hundred times, while real earnings 
declined by more than 80 percent. 55 According to Tikhomirov, the real average wage in 
the Russian national economy fell by almost two-thirds during the first five years of 
reform, 56 a factor contributing to a further decline in real living standards. 
52 Reddaway and Glinski 248; macroeconomic stabilization as judged by GDP levels, inflation rates, and the volume of 
industrial output. Figures illustrating the degree of economic decline are shown in section 2.3.1. 
53 Vladimir Tikhomirov, The Political Economy of Post-Soviet Russia (New York: St. Martin' s Press, 2000) 228. 
54 Oliver Blanchard eta!, Post-Communist Reform: Pain and Progress (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993)19; 
Reddaway and Glinski 247. 
55 Michael Chossudovsky, The Globalization of Poverty: Impacts ofiMF and World Bank Reform (London: Zed 
Books, 1997) 226. 
56 Tikhomirov 192. 
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The instant removal of state monopoly in the area of foreign trade opened ways 
for quick and virtually unlimited enrichment on the part of the Russian elite that had 
access to, or control over, export production and distribution. 57 On the other hand, the 
opening up of the economy was followed by the local manufacturing industry sliding into 
a deep recession: the abrupt freeing of foreign trade meant a massive supply shock to 
national manufacturing, further aggravated by the negative effects of collapse in demand 
from the former Soviet republics and the COMECON states, and in government 
demand. 58 
Price liberalization carried out in the absence of an effective distribution system, 
commercial banks or a labour market, inevitably led to a prolonged economic slump; the 
lifting of price controls and subsidies should have been preceded by building institutions 
and demonopolization. 59 
2.2.3. Privatization 
The final element of the 1992 Y eltsin-IMF reform was the mass privatization of state 
property: privatization has been the core policy of economic liberalization in Russia. By 
the end of 1996, 90 percent of the gross output ofboth industry and the retail trade were 
corning from the private sector. 60 According to the reformers, privatization of state 
property should have led to the growth of efficiency in the economy as a whole, followed 
by an increase in gross output and accumulation of investment capital within the country. 
Yet the results were quite the opposite: national production output continued to decline, 
efficiency in most sectors of the economy remained low, and large amounts of currency 
57 Tikhomirov 229. 
58 Braginsky and Yav1insky 115. 
59 Sakwa 253 




were exported from Russia as opposed to being invested in the economy. 61 The graph 
below shows that the mass sale of state property failed to achieve its main objective of 
reversing Russia' s negative production dynamics: privatization has failed to generate any 
significant growth in the national economy. 
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Source: Vladimir Tikhornirov, "The Political Economy of Post-Soviet Russia," p. 262. 
The essence ofthe privatization campaign was bluntly expressed by Yetsin' s chief 
economic advisor and Deputy Prime-Minister Yegor Gaidar in the following way: "We 
allowed the elite to exchange their power for property."62 The fact that a small group of 
insiders from the old communist-era elite took control over vast resources was viewed as 
an injustice by those who believed in democracy and reform, and were supporting Y eltsin 
and his associates during the critical time of their assault on the old system. Gaidar' s 
statement, in fact, turned out to be only a half-truth: while elites indeed were able to 
appropriate most of the state' s property, in many cases at the same time they were 
allowed to retain power and their positions at the top levels ofboth the government and 
61 Tikhomirov 259. 
62 Yegor Gaidar as cited in Rose Brady, Kapitalizm: Russia' s Struggle To Free Its Economy (London: Yale University 
Press, 1999) 63. 
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the enterprises. On the other hand, Gaidar' s statement shows the populism of earlier 
Y eltsin declarations such as one in which Y eltsin told Russians that " ... we need millions 
of owners rather than a handful of millionaires ... the privatization voucher is a ticket for 
each of us to a free economy."63 
While indeed millions of privatization vouchers were distributed to the public -
one for every adult and a child - their value turned out to be worth less than $25 each. 
Most people either sold them immediately due to their hyperinflation-caused 
impoverishment, or else ' invested' them in fraudulent voucher pyramids posing as 
legitimate mutual funds . In the end, the shares purchased with vouchers mostly ended up 
in the hands of the same nomenclatura64 who benefited from other forms of 
privatization.65 In addition, the value of state property was kept artificially low; therefore, 
state assets could be - and were - acquired at a fraction of their market value. 66 Thus, as 
an example, a downtown Moscow hotel could have been purchased for less than the price 
of a Paris apartment; an enterprise identical to a Polish company that sold earlier for $80 
million during the course ofPolish privatization, sold in Russia for slightly more than 
half a million. 67 
"Voucher privatization" should be differentiated from what became known as the 
"loans-for-shares" privatization scheme, under which certain banks were allowed to 
acquire control of some of Russia's largest oil and natural-resourse companies for low 
prices. Sachs called the "loans-for-shares" scheme one ofthe most corrupt privatization 
processes in world history: "tens of billions of dollars worth of natural resource deposits 
63 Yeltsin as cited in Reddaway and Glinski, 248. 
64 This term describes the Soviet (and later the Russian, Ukrainian, Kazakh, etc.) party-state elite. As the political 
developments of post-Soviet Russia and the other FSU states have shown, nomenclatura turned out to be neutral to 
ideology- and thus it could be communist, anticommunist, and even "democratic", depending on the circumstances. 
65 Brady 65-118. 
66 Menshikov 138; Chossudovsky 231. 
67 Brady 75 . 
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were turned over to Yeltsin' s insiders, doing much to create the corrupt 'oligarchy' that 
has so poisoned Russia' s politics ... "68 Most privatizations were carried out through 
backroom deals among insiders, with company managers and the nomenclatura the most 
frequent beneficiaries. In contrast to the Western practice of privatization, which started 
with loss-making enterprises, in Russia it was the most profitable enterprises (including 
strategic asset industries) that were first of all given up into private hands. As a result of 
such a policy, the state treasury has been emptied and the state itself became almost 
bankrupt.69 During the privatization campaign, "the ' property of all the people ' was 
turned into a boundless reservoir of funds for personal enrichment;"70 it is no surprise that 
most observers use negatively-charged terms while describing the event: "nomenklatura 
privatization;" "predatory privatization;" "phony privatization;" and "robber baron 
privatization."71 Ill-designed, marked by corruption, failing to deliver results in terms of 
increased efficiency, and adding another serious institutional lock-in to the extremely 
difficult task of restoring Russian industry, " .. . the Russian privatization program [has 
been one of] the most spectacular failures in the history of economic reform."72 
There are several lessons that can be learnt from the experience of the Russian 
privatization attempt. First, privatizing ownership will not necessary make uncompetitive 
enterprises operate more efficiency. Secondly, companies do not exist in an institutional 
vacuum: socioeconomic institutions are needed as a precondition for private ownership. 
Finally, dishonest and ineffective public administration and the related problem of 
corruption represent a major threat to both economy and democracy. 73 
68 Jeffery Sachs, "Russia' s Tumultuous Decade," Washington Monthly Vol. 32, Issue 3, (March 2000):37. 
69 Bogomolov 102. 
70 Boris Kagarlistky, Restoration in Russia: Why Capitalism Failed (London: Verso, 1995) 3. 
71 Terms used by Reddaway and Glinski; Derlugian; Braguinsky and Yavlinsky; and Stiglitz respectively. 
72 Braguinsky and Yavlisky, 122-123. 
73 Stephen Cohen and Andrew Schwartz, "Deeper Into the Tunnel," The Tunnel at the End of the Light: Privatization, 
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There were claims made by some observers that the policies of structural 
adjustment/shock therapy were gradually phased out in the second half of 1992; another 
viewpoint is that they had never been applied in Russia in its original design in the flrst 
place. 74 However, the important thing to note here is that the flscal and monetary 
prescriptions of shock therapy were generally adhered to by the Russian administration 
during the timeframe between 1992 and 1999. Thus, as Gill and Markwick point out, in 
the course of most of the 1990s, 
[p]rices remained unregulated, state orders were reduced, government spending continued 
to be reduced, industrial subsides declined, the rouble was made convertible, the economy 
was opened up to foreign investment, most controls on exports and imports were eased ... 
the second infsedient of shock therapy, wholesale privatization of state enterprises, was 
implemented. 5 
While the Y eltsin administration made numerous retreats and tactical maneuvers over the 
course of two presidential terms, the doctrine of shock therapy within the framework of a 
radical economic reform guided the policies of Y eltsin and his associates for most of the 
1990s; as Reddaway and Glinski show, the appointment in March 1997 of radical 
reformers Chubais and Nemtsov was seen by most Western and Russian observers as 
"the second round of shock therapy offensive."76 Therefore, claims stating that the 
policies of shock therapy were applied in Russia only during a relatively short period of 
1992-1993 cannot be supported by the available evidence. 
To sum up the discussion about the elements of economic reform in Russia: the 
neoliberal economic strategy with the basic elements of stabilization, liberalization and 
privatization has had some positive effects on only a marginal part of the Russian 
Business Networks, and Economic Transfonnation in Russia," ed. Stephen Cohen et al. (Berkley: University of 
California, 1998) 8. 
74 See, for example, Aslund; Sachs. 
75 Graeme Gill and Roger Markwick, Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 139. 
76 Reddaway and Glinski 234, 532-541. 
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economy.77 The real economic indicators otherwise testify to a large-scale collapse of the 
nation' s economy. Privatization, the core policy of economic liberalization, failed in its 
objective of increasing the country' s economic output and ultimately raising the 
population' s living standards. 
As we have seen, the immediate and medium-term macroeconomic effects ofthe 
structural adjustment policies have had, for the most part, a negative influence on the 
national economy. At the same time, a short transitional recession has been both 
predicted and anticipated by the proponents of the radical approach to the transition. Let 
us now conclude the discussion of the direct effects of the adopted economic strategy and 
move on to consider the more general and long-term economic, social, and political 
outcomes that are the subject of the next section. 
2.3. Long-term outcomes 
The pitiful condition in which today' s Russia finds itself has become well known through 
both the mass media and academic writings; it would be reasonable to assume this 
condition is evident to most observers and is beyond dispute. Considering the space 
limitations of this project, we will touch on a few topics that represent the major long-
term economic and social outcomes ofthe post-Soviet reform. 
2.3.1. Economic outcomes 
The economic crisis experienced by Russia in the post-Soviet period has indeed been a 
profound one. According to Reddaway and Glinski, the level of decline " ... has exceeded 
that of the comparable American experience during the Great Depression and the 
77 This progress mostly relating to foreign trade and consumer demand (Braguinsky and Yavlisky 11 6). 
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industrial loss inflicted on the Soviet Union in 1941-45 by World War 11."78 Let us look 
at the most important indicators first . From 1991 to 1998, the national GDP declined by 
43.3 percent; industrial production fell by 56 percent and the agricultural output declined 
by almost 60 percent.79 Capital investment in the Russian economy during the first four 
years of reform fell by 78 percent and that trend has continued ever since. 80 At the same 
time, large amounts of capital are being transferred abroad: the issue of capital flight 
became a serious problem in a country where an estimated US$12-15 billion is leaving 
the country on an annual basis. 81 The estimates of the gross capital flight since 1990 
range anywhere from US$150 billion to US$400 billion during the first seven years of 
liberal economic reform. 82 
It appears that one of the most helpful and illustrative ways to show the dynamics 
of post-communist Russian development is to present essential indicators83 in a tabulated 
form. The following two tables show selected indicators for the years 1993 -1999; both 
illustrate the magnitude of the Russian economic recession. 
Table 2. Genera/Indicators of Russia's Performance in 1993-97. 
Gross Domestic Product 
Dynamics ofGDP, 1993-100" 
Purrnua1change, ~ 
Federal Budget 
Revenues, 1993-1 ooan 
Expenditure, 1993-1 oo• 
Budget deficit, 1993=100" 
State Borrowing 
Foreign debt in US$, 1993-100° 
78 Reddaway and Glinski 2 
79 Reddaway and Glinski 2. 
80 Reddaway and Glinski 2. 
81 Tikhomirov 148. 






















Overdue Social Payments 
Gross wage arrears, 1993= 1 oo•c 
Unpaid wages as % of gross monthly wage fund in all national 
economy 
Peiformance of the Economy 
Industrial output, 1993=100 
Agricultural output, 1993= 100 
Gross volume of unpaid taxes, 1993= 1 oo•c 
Inter-enterprise debt, 1993=100ac 
Dynamics of capital fight, 1993= 100 
Social Dynamics 
Average income: 
In US dollars, 1993=100 
In constant prices, 1993= 1 oo• 
Unemployment, 1993=100Cd 
Notes: 











b Russian Statistics on revenues of the federal budget include internal and foreign loans 
' As at the end of the year. 











Source: Vladimir Tikhomirov, "The Political Economy of the Post-Soviet Russia" (2000), p. 325, 326. 
Table 3. Selected economic and social indicators, 1994-1999 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
Real GDP index (per cent change) -12.7 -4.2 -3 .5 0.9 
Real industrial output index (per cent -21.0 -3 .0 -4.0 2.0 
change) 
Consumer price inflation (per cent) 215.1 131.3 21.8 11.0 
Real per capita income ( 1993 - 1 00) 111.9 83 .9 99.6 102.8 
Unemployment rate (ILO definition, per 7.4 8.8 9.9 11.2 
cent) 
Share of loss-making enterprises (per cent) 32.5 34.2 50.6 50.1 
Mortality rate (per 1,000; 1990 = 11.2) 15.7 15.0 14.2 13 .8 
Population (million) 147.9 147.6 147.1 146.7 





















Sources: OECD Publications, "The Social Crisis in the Russian Federation" (2001) p. 34, 37; Jeni Klugman, "Poverty in Russia: 











The radical economic reform of 1992 eliminated the old structures of regulation, finance, 
i 
and law, but failed to build an adequate system of domestic institutional infrastructure, 




support of competition, an appropriate legal framework, and measures to stimulate the 
transfer oftechnologies and to enhance market transparency.84 On the threshold ofthe 
new century, the productivity of the Russian economy "was cut to less than half, 
industrial output fell to 40 percent of what it had been, and in the light industry and the 
food industry it dropped by two-thirds," 85 as compared with the pre-reform level. 
Since the beginning of the transition, the Russian economy has not experienced 
any meaningful growth. Neither has the Russian government succeeded in accumulating 
foreign currency reserves on any significant scale. 86 While most of the investment in 
industry was directed towards the oil and gas sectors, no new notable production plants 
were built during the years of reform; the Russian economy does not have internal 
economic mechanisms for growth.87 Within a period of seven years the country's 
external debt has grown 3.7 times from about US$40 billion at the beginning of the 
reform in 1992 to about US$147 billion in early 1999.88 The figure below illustrates the 
dynamics of state debt accumulation. 
Figure 2. Annual Dynamics of Growth of State Debt Accumulation (billion current US 







1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Q Annual Gross Internal Borrowing 
fiij Annual Gross External Borrowing 
Source: Vladimir Tikhomirov, "The Political Economy of the Post-Soviet Russia" (2000), p. 61. 
The financial crisis of August 1998 and the Russian government' s default on its loan 
84 Stiglitz, "Whither Reform" 24. 
85 Bogomolov 99-100. The figures cited by Bogomolov differ slightly from those sited by Reddaway and Glinski at the 
beginning of section 2.3.1. 
86 Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 116. 
87 Menshikov 92. 
88 Vladimir Tikhomirov, "The Second Collapse of the Soviet economy: Myths and Realities of the Russian Reform." 
Europe-Asia Studies Vol 52 Issue 2 (March 2000): 207. .-1 
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repayment obligations has further underscored the fragile and unstable nature of the 
Russian transition to the market economy. 
Thus, as Braguinsky and Yavlinsky note, "the ' achievements' ofthe policy of 
macroeconomic stabilization are . . . completely illusory."89 It can be argued that one of 
the major causes ofthe reform failure has been too much emphasis on macroeconomic 
stabilization at the expense of institution-building. 9° Creating a purely liberal economy in 
Russia over a short period of time, in conditions where an appropriate institutional 
infrastructure has been almost nonexistent turned out to be a utopian idea. 
It must be noted that over the last two years91, the Russian economy has finally 
achieved, for the first time since 1991, stabilization of its economy and even a modest 
degree of economic growth.92 The two major factors of this recovery were high global oil 
prices and a fivefold depreciation of the national currency. High oil prices created a 
surplus in the budget while the devaluation stimulated national production and exports. 
Despite this growth, the Russian government itself on many occasions has admitted that 
these favorable factors cannot be counted on in the medium and long term. 93 The 
economy remains highly vulnerable to commodity price swings. Resource extraction 
revenue alone cannot support the Russian economy for any prolonged period oftime.94 
Unless the national economic growth of the last two years is secured by sustainable 
economic policy, the Russian administration " ... will confront an impoverished 
population and a crumbling Soviet infrastructure with no tools at hand."95 
In summing up the discussion regarding the outcomes of Russian economic 
89 Braguinsky and Yavlisnky 11 6. 
90 "Sick Patients, Waning Doctors" Economist 18 September 1999: 81. 
91 1999-2000. 
92 Deluguian 26. 
93 Lukin48. 
94 Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 242. 
95 Lukin48. 
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reform, it is difficult not to agree with Tikhomirov' s conclusion when he states that 
" ... by the end of 1998 Russia was even farther away from achieving its initial reform 
objectives, than it was at the very start of reform in 1992."96 
2.3.2. Social outcomes 
a) Decline in the quality of health care and education 
The eroding safety net resulted in the rapid deterioration of the health care and 
educational systems. There was transfer of responsibility for these spheres from the 
central to the local and provincial governments. Since such a transfer was not 
accompanied by an adequate transfer of funds, the quality of health care and education 
has been reduced.97 Doctors and teachers are presently among the lowest income-
earning group; both hospitals and schools were forced to introduce user fees for a number 
of essential services, making such services inaccessible to the poorer segment of the 
population. There was a large increase in mortality rates coupled with a decrease in life 
expectancy that coincided with the attempts to introduce market reforms. Studies have 
shown that mortality in Russia is strongly correlated with such measures of reform 
success- or its failure- as GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment rates. 98 
b) Social costs of unemployment 
It came as no surprise that reductions in state subsidies and the privatization of state 
property made unemployment unavoidable. However, the magnitude ofunemployment 
has been larger then predicted. According to Nolan, already in 1994 the number of 
unemployed was estimated at 10 million, representing 13 percent ofthe economically 
96 Tikhomirov 332. 
97 Silverman and Yanowich 25. 
98 Elizabeth Brainerd, "Market Reform and Mortality in Transition Economies," World Development (1998, Vol. 26, 
No. 11)2013. 
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active population. At the same time, a large proportion of the employed were receiving 
no pay for long periods oftime.99 According to Tikhomirov, total employment declined 
from a figure of over 75 million people in 1990 to 64.6 million in 1997, representing a 
negative change of 14 percent over the time period of 1990-1997.100 The unemployment 
indicators from yet another source show a pattern where unemployment is slowly but 
steadily increasing from 1 percent in 1992 to the high of 13 .3 percent in 1998, only 
slightly diminishing to 12.0 percent in 1999, based on official estimates. 101 Determining 
the real levels ofunemployment is difficult since the registered unemployment figures do 
not include a substantial number of unemployed who fail to register. 102 Clarke cites an 
example of one of the Russia' s regions where the official unemployment rate was 
standing at 2 percent, while the independent labor force survey came to a conclusion that 
the unemployment rate at the time stood at 23 percent. 103 Thus, another outcome of 
liberal economic reform has been that of a previously unknown phenomenon, mass 
unemployment. 104 
c) Poverty and inequality 
Unemployment resulted in falling incomes, which in tum were followed by an increase in 
levels of poverty for the majority of the population. The reforms "created a handful of 
super wealthy individuals, while leaving the rest behind to struggle." 105 According to 
different estimates of poverty shown in Table 4 below, poverty levels were within the 
range of30-50 percent on average in 1993-94 and remained almost unchanged five years 
99 Nolan22. 
100 Tikhomirov 170. 
101 "Key Data 1990-99", <http://www. bcemag.cornl_ bcedblhistory.idc> 
102 The collapse in real government expenditure led to falling levels of government illlemployment pay; as a result, 
fewer and fewer illlemployed were bothering to register. 
103 Clarke, "Poverty in Russia" 12. 
104 Bogomolov 100. 
105 Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 7. 
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later, standing on average at around 40 percent in 1999. It follows that in absolute 
numbers, over 58 million people in the Russian Federation were living below the poverty 
line by the end of 1999. 106 
Table 4. Estimates of Russian Poverty Rates 
Source Period Estimated proportion 
of impoverished 
population(%) 
Yogesh Atal 1960-1985 10 
Official Estimates: 






International Labour Organization (ILO) 1992 85 
All-Russian Standard of Living Centre 1994 39 
"Arugmenty ifacty" newspaper 1994 61 
Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VtsiOM) 1994 54 
Tat'iana Saslavskaia 1993 40.7 
Reddaway and Glisnki 1999 41.2 
Sources: Atal, "Poverty in Transition and Transition in Poverty," (1999) p. 31 ; Silverman and Yanowitch, "New Rich, New Poor, 
New Russia" (2000) p. 42, 47, 48; Reddaway and Glinski, "The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms" (2001) p. 620; OECD Publications, 
"The Social Crisis in the Russian Federation" (2001) p. 39. 
At the same time, the household savings have been steadily diminishing over the period 
of 1991-1994: 
Table 5. Changes in Savings Concentration 
(Survey question: "Does your household have any savings?'7 
Answers August 1991 March 1992 June 1993 October February 
1993 1994 
Yes 66 60 25 19 17 
No 30 36 7l 76 78 
Difficult to 4 4 4 5 5 
answer 
Source: Atal, "Poverty in Transition and Transition in Poverty," (1999) p. 208. 
Rising inequality has been yet another feature ofRussian post-Soviet 
developments. The measures of income distribution below indicate how rapidly the 
country has been transformed from a relatively equal society to one with considerable 
106 
The subsistence minimum, based on the concept of absolute poverty, is used as the official poverty line in the 
Russian Federation. It is detennined by the cost of a market basket, valued at average prices in each region, that 
provides the minimum required caloric intake. 
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income disparities. The Gini coefficient, a general measure of inequality, rose from 0.24 
in 1989 to 0.48 in 1996, a doubling ofinequality 107 . According to Shlapentokh, the 
Y eltsin regime demonstrated very little concern for the plight of the poor, viewing social 
inequality as a "prerequisite" for economic growth: 
... the liberal establishment of the 1990's virtually discarded such words as "equality" 
and "parity" from its lexicon. These words were almost completely absent from the 
speeches made by Yeltsin and his premiers in 1992-98, nor were they present in the 
multitude of articles and essays which lauded the regime during this period.1 08 
The income ratio between the wealthiest and the bottom 10 percent of population 
increased from 4: 1 in 1990 to 15 : 1 in 1994, and in terms of the disparity in personal 
income, Russia is now ranked among countries such as Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico. 
As it stands today, all Western countries including the United States are much more 
egalitarian than Russia. 109 According to a recent study conducted by the World Bank, the 
level of social and income differentiation in Russia is estimated as the highest in Eastern 
Europe, and most participants of the study claimed that "the well-being of the absolute 
majority of the people had deteriorated during the last decade."110 
2.3.3. Political outcomes 
Democratization ofRussian society- as represented by a relatively free press, mass 
political parties, freedom of speech, and mostly free elections - appears to be the only 
major achievement the post-communist period can be credited with. However, that credit 
should be given mainly to Gorbachev' s administration rather than that ofYeltsin' s, as all 
the above democratic freedoms came during the period of 1987-1991 111 • Furthermore, 
107 UNDP, Human Development Report 1999 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 85. 
108 Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Social Inequality in Post-Communist Russia," Europe-Asia Studies. (November, 99): 1167. 
109 Shlapentokh 1155. 
110 "Consultations with the Poor," The World Bank, http://worldbank.org/poverty/conspoor/national.htm. 
111 This despite the fact Gorbachev has never been elected by the populace in contrast to Yeltsin. 
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many observers point out an inclination toward authoritarianism by both the Y eltsin and 
Putin administrations. 112 The Yeltsin regime's attempts to retain and consolidate its 
power without addressing the legitimacy issue resulted in a pattern of escalating 
autocratic centralization of executive powers. Traditions of totalitarianism and 
Bolshevism that Yeltsin and his aides inherited from their Soviet incarnation led to 
Yeltsin severely restricting the democracy created by Gorbachev. 11 3 Thus, the Russian 
constitution was fraudulently amended in 1993 to increase presidential powers. 11 4 
Perhaps the most profound violation of the constitutional law occurred in October 
of 1993, when Yeltsin dispersed a democratically elected parliament by way of attacking 
the Russian White House with heavy artillery and special commando units, ending the 
Russian experiment in the democratic separation of powers and killing in the process 
close to two hundred members of parliament and their defenders. 115 Yet another 
spectacular violation of democracy and the law took place during the 1996 presidential 
elections, when the expenses of Y eltsin' s campaign ran at least thirty times above the 
legal spending limit and an additional $10 billion in the Russian Treasury funds were 
spent with the aim of securing wider electoral support. There also were serious violations 
of the law in television and press coverage of the election campaign, coverage that was 
strongly tilted in favour of Y eltsin. 11 6 In sum, "the logic of the political struggle led 
Y eltsin to eliminate or significantly curtail the powers of the independent institutions that 
had emerged during the Gorbachev period," 11 7 destroying the parliamentary republic and 
112 See, for example, Hough, Job, K.agarlistky, Fish, Deluguian, Buzgalin and Koganov, and Reddaway and Glinski. 
113 Hough 129. 
11 4 Job 933. 
115 Alexander Buzhalin and Andrei Kolganov, Bloody October in Moscow: Political Repression in the Name of 
Reform. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994) 188,189. 
116 Reddaway and Glinsky 515. 
117 Aleksander Lukin,"Putin' s Regime: Restoration or Revolution?" Problems of Post-Communism (Jul/Aug 2001, Vol. 
48, Issue 4):38. 
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introducing super-presidential rule. 
It can also be argued that a high-speed transition in itself is undemocratic: the 
faster the transition process, the less possibility there is for the population to provide 
feedback or to participate in that process. Thus, in Russia the population has been largely 
excluded from providing comments or suggestions in regard to reform outcomes due to 
the speed of the transition. 118 
Just a few years after adopting the neo-liberal developmental strategy, Russia 
ceased to have an independent economic policy and sunk to the level of a heavily 
indebted third world country, forced to comply with conditions imposed by the 
international financial institutions. 11 9 "Russia became ever weaker internationally, to the 
point that its policies were constructed at the direct instruction of the major international 
capitalist institutions. In the brief space of just a few years it had been humiliated and 
broken as a great power."120 
Late 1999 and early 2000 saw Y eltsin successfully transferring his power to a 
chosen successor, Vladimir Putin. While it is too early to say which way Putin ' s 
presidency will affect democratic development, certain actions of the new Russian 
president give reason for concern: in his first decree, Putin granted his patron Yeltsin 
immunity from prosecution; he also has further concentrated political and economic 
power in his hands.121 
As we can see from some of the accounts and observations discussed above, the 
fate ofRussian democratization at the moment lies in the balance. While the future of 
democracy in Russia is uncertain, it is important to note that under Y eltsin, "Russia was 
118 Nolan 87. 
119 Nolan 286. 
120 Nolan 302. 
121 Lukin 48. 
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thrown backward regarding the development of civil society and is now farther removed 
from the initial goals ofthe democratic movement than it was before Yeltsin came to 
power."122 
3. Why the failure? 
The roots of the reform failure are interconnected ones and can be ultimately traced to 
wrong policy choices. Economic and ideological radicalism, a wrong choice of 
developmental strategy, attempts to impose reform through a top-down approach while 
alienating the majority of population to the reform process through implementation of 
policies that have widened the gap between elites and society - these are the principal 
factors explaining the reform outcomes. Let us examine each one in tum. 
3.1. Radicalism 
It is highly symbolic that both Russian revolutions of the 20th century- that of 1917 and 
of 1991- came under the sign of radicalism, both ideological and economic. Both the 
original socialist Bolsheviks and their new "market" incarnation viewed themselves as an 
enlightened vanguard who needed to implement their program from the top down; in the 
process, pain and sacrifice were a necessary part ofbuilding a brighter future . Neither 
group believed in alternative strategies to achieve its goals nor in a gradual approach to 
transforming the economy.123 Both groups were able to ultimately seize power and to 
implement their top-down policies nation-wide. No wonder that the outcome has been 
122 Reddaway and Glinski 628. 
123 Silvennan and Yanowich xx (introduction). 
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similar, too : from the political oppression, economic inefficiency and ideological 
dogmatism of communism, the country moved to political instability, economic collapse, 
and poverty and inequality ofthe 1990s' unfettered capitalism. The nee-liberal economic 
radicalism of the last ten years, combined with the economic radicalism of the seventy 
years of the communist regime, resulted in a situation where the country found itself in a 
state of deep economic, social, and ideological crisis by the end of the 20th century. 
In order to better understand the radical approach to economic reform and the 
roots of its failure in Russia, it is instructive to examine the viewpoint of shock therapy's 
most prominent advocates and the advisors to the Russian government in 1991-1992, 
David Lipton and Jeffery Sachs. Their discussion of the transition emphasizes the 
political success of the reform, at the same time ignoring, for the most part, the 
immediate economic effects. The focus has been on replacing existing institutional 
structures, as opposed to changing them. As Murrell writes, "[h]istory, society, and the 
economics of present institutions [were] all minor issues in choosing a reform 
program."124 In the analysis ofLipton and Sachs circa 1992, "enormous scope exists for 
increases in average living standards ... the issues of greatest importance can be solved 
within half a year."125 While the establishment of a market economy, as envisioned by 
Lipton and Sachs, included the destruction of existing institutions, it was assumed at the 
same time that institutional construction can be achieved through technocratic solutions 
that are easy to implement. Thus, shock therapy in the view of its advocates "is nothing 
less than a revolutionary strategy for the complete reconstruction of the economic 
arrangements of a country," 126 a strategy to be carried out within a relatively short period 
124 Peter Murrell, "What is Shock Therapy? What Did it Do in Poland and Russia?" Post-Soviet Affairs Vol. 9 Issue 2 
(1993): 113-115. 
125 Lipton and Sachs as cited in Murrell, 114. 
126 Murrell 115. 
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of time utilizing a top-down policy approach. 
3. 2. A wrong choice of developmental strategy 
Judging by the economic indicators of the late Soviet state, it becomes evident that the 
inefficient state-controlled planned economy of pre-reform USSR had to be dismantled 
and replaced with a modern mixed economy. An important question here is: what 
developmental model would have been the most suitable and beneficial? More 
specifically, what balance between decentralized decision-making and government 
control would have been the most appropriate for transitional Russia? Figure 3 shows a 
straight line representing the continuum of all existing and known economic systems with 
Britain ofthe first halfofthe 1800s (unfettered capitalism) at one end and the USSR with 
its almost pure command system at the other end. It is evident that a transition to a 
social-democratic economic model could have been an easier option for Russia: such a 
movement would have covered a much shorter distance on the continuum. The distance 
between "USSR" and "LE" represents a more difficult transition than from "USSR" to 
"SD", since an all-embracing change ofthe country' s economic and institutional 
structures was required for a transition to a liberal model of economic management. In 
other words, many institutions of social democracy were already in place; there was no 
need to dismantle them.127 
Figure 3. The continuum representing different mixed-economy arrangements. 
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However, while the institutions ofthe old system had been largely destroyed in 1990-
1992, it was assumed that the new market institutions are of secondary importance and 
would arise by themselves. This contradicts the growing evidence to the contrary in 
general, and the argument of the Nobel Prize laureate Douglass North in particular, who 
writes that 
[i]institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They 
are made up offormal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms 
of behaviour, conventions) .. .. The single most important point about institutional change 
... is that [it] is overwhelmingly incremental.128 
----1 
As we can see, markets are not self-forming mechanisms, but a set of institutions that are 
created on a gradual basis. In the Russian case, the existing institutions could have been 
adapted to the market economy framework in the way it has been done in China, where a 
gradual approach to reform was chosen and where existing institutions were modified to_j 
fit the new market realities. 
One of the most comprehensive comparative Russia-China studies has been 
carried out by Peter Nolan, 129 in which he analyzed and compared reform policies and 
transition strategies in both countries. According to Nolan, prior to transition both 
countries shared many areas of fundamental similarity. On the other hand, looking at the 
differences between the systems, Nolan suggests that overall, the USSR was in a much 
more favorable position prior to the initiation of the reforms and thus was likely to 
perform better than China, not the reverse.130 The key to understanding China' s success 
and Russia ' s failure lies in the respective country' s approach towards the transition 
strategy: in Russia, the leadership rapidly introduced most of the measures under the 
128 Douglass C. North, "Epilogue: Economic Performance through Time," in Lee Alston, Tirrainn 
Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North, eds., Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 344. 
129 Nolan 1-320. 
130 Nolan 307. 
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"stabilization and structural adjustment package;" in China, on the other hand, an 
incremental, gradualist system of reform was chosen: 
... the selection of different policies in Russia could have produced rapid growth of 
output and a large improvement in popular living standards, ... [while] the selection of a 
different set of policies in China could easily have produced a political and economic 
disaster, with a large decline in popular living standards .... [T]he contrasting outcomes in 
China and Russia stem from the sharply different approaches taken by the respective 
leadership in the two countries towards the transition orthodoxy.131 
Despite the fact that the economics of the Chinese reform were often considered in the 
West as primitive and were widely criticized, the Chinese leadership resisted those 
pressures and adopted policies what were quite contrary to those of the neo-liberal 
orthodoxy.132 The gradualist, incremental approach to reform resulted in a spectacular 
economic boom that continued almost uninterrupted into the 21st century. The growth of 
output and real income translated into substantial improvements in the physical quality of 
life for the majority of the country' s population. 133 In the Russian case, " .. . the 
fundamental cause of the [Russian] collapse lies in the destruction of the state 
administrative apparatus and the nation-state .. .. the reforms caused a disastrous decline in 
investment and industrial output, setting in motion a vicious circle of economic 
collapse." 134 
China's reforms show that a gradual process of institution creation135 is both 
possible and viable, by pragmatically combining elements ofthe old and the new; and 
that sustained economic growth is possible without mass privatization of the state 
sector. 136 Over the ten-year period 1989-1998, Russia's GDP almost halved while 
China' s GDP nearly doubled. At the same time, inequality in Russia doubled.137 The 
131 Nolan 302 305 
132 Nolan 306, . 
133 Nolan 303. 
134 Nolan 309, 302. 
135 
Institutions as represented by structures of law, finance, and regulation. 
136 Murrell 121. 
137 
Joseph Stiglitz, "Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition," World Bank Keynote Address (April 28, 1099) 3. 
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enormous success of China can be reasonably explained by that country' s reliance on its 
own path of transition in contrast to the Russian approach, where a "blueprint," "one-
size-fits-all" method had been applied. China' s development path can be credited not 
only with rapid economic growth, but also with creating a vibrant non-state-owned 
collective enterprise sector, and with stimulating large-scale foreign investment in 
infrastructure, particularly in manufacturing. In contrast, there has been little productive 
investment in the post-1991 Russian physical infrastructure.138 An argument stating that 
China's experience should be regarded as purely specific and unique and, therefore, 
should be looked upon as an exception is hardly convincing since the twenty years of 
sustained economic advance cannot be attributed exclusively to some kind of especially 
favorable circumstances specific to that country. 139 
As Stiglitz argues, the institutional infrastructure, including both regulatory and 
legal structures, is absolutely essential to a functioning market economy.140 According to 
Pereira et al., "[m]arket orientation is not sufficient to generate market coordination 
toward collective prosperity." 141 Moreover, the reform approach must be highly 
dependent on the history and the specific nature of a given country. 142 
3. 3. Lack of mass support 
This paper has been arguing that an alternative, moderate economic strategy with a 
social-democratic orientation would have been far less costly and would have offered 
better prospects for the Russian economy. For the purposes of this essay we will define 
138 Hough 14-15, Gustafson 221-222. 
139 Bogomolov 100. 
140 Stiglitz, "The Insider," 58 
141 Pereira et al. , 6; emphasis in original. 
142 Murrell 125. 
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social democracy as an economic system operating within a framework of a mixed 
capitalist economy with a public sector accountable to the government, the national 
economy amenable to fine-tuning of demand, the vitality of democracy sustained by 
political pluralism and mass parties. This version of a social democratic project could be 
viewed as the principal democratic alternative to liberalism, a strategy ensuring that 
capitalism works for the maximum benefit of all. 
Why social democracy? Apart from the institutional infrastructure aspect 
discussed above143 , a social-democratic approach to reform would cushion the transitional 
shocks experienced by the majority of the population and therefore would have the 
potential to ensure continuous mass support for reform. This aspect is of critical 
importance. Reform has failed, at least in part, because the Russian liberal reformers 
failed to understand that mass support is crucial for the outcome of the reform process. 
The implemented policies impoverished the majority ofthe population while increasing 
the gap between elites and the rest of society. 
The great majority of Russian society was completely unprepared for the 
encounter with the market system and as a result ended up in financial ruin, becoming 
"the losing majority on the Russian expressway to capitalism."144 Thus, popular support 
for the market economy, which had been widespread in the country prior to the initiation 
ofthe radical reform program, has greatly diminished: the social costs of reform to 
Russian society have turned out to be exceptionally high. 145 It can be argued that mass 
support is central to both the achievement of a democratic outcome146 and to a success of 
the economic dimension of reform. In the absence of such support, social tensions 
143 See discussion in relation to Figure 3. 
144 Boris Kagarlitsky, Restoration in Russia (London: Verso, 1995) 118. 
145 Reddaway and Glinski 29, 307, 384, 385. 
146 Gill and Markwick 251 . 
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threaten the viability of economic development; numerous strikes that took place in the 
1990s147 and continuous parliament opposition to many economic initiatives put forward 
by the Russian administration are just two examples of tensions that undermined the 
efforts ofthe government to stabilize the economic performance. Thus, lack of popular 
support, initially being an outcome ofthe adopted reform course, also became in many 
ways a cause of reform failure . 
A viable middle class is another important pre-condition for a successful 
transition to capitalism. As Naumova points out, "[ o ]nly a strong and numerous middle 
class can serve as a bulwark of reform, ensuring ... economic growth and the economic 
effectiveness ofreforms." 148 The shock therapy of 1992- 1997 and the financial crisis of 
1998 combined with the post-Soviet changes in income distribution "are indicative of a 
process of gradual disappearance of the Russian middle class,"149 the very force that the 
Russian liberal reformers were counting on for support and promotion of the nee-liberal 
model of economic management. 
In sum, it can be argued that the reforms could have had a different outcome had 
the Russian government chosen an alternative, moderate economic strategy utilizing 
some of the existing institutions, a strategy emphasizing social justice and public welfare 
and based on a mixed economic model with the elements ofKeynesianism. According to 
Bogomolov, 
[a] comparative analysis of the results of the reforms in the post-socialist countries makes it 
possible to draw an important conclusion: some continuity should be maintained with the 
socialist past; not everything has to be mdically altered. The Soviet model, created on the 
principles of state ownership and centralized planning ... was in some ways viable, since it 
did ensure development (in some periods highly dynamic) of the economy and a rise in 
living standards. Its evident flaws ... made it necessary to abandon the model. But this 
does not mean that the pages of history have no value at all and need to be rewritten 
entirely.150 
The uncritical embracing of an unsuitable developmental strategy based on the 
147 Gill and Markwick 232, 233 . 
148 Nina Naumova as cited in Silverman and Yanowitch, 30. 
149 Tikhomirov 191. 
150 Bogomolov 101. 
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assumption that an unregulated market would always self-coordinate and would achieve, 
in all circumstances, allocative efficiency can be seen as the key explanation for reform 
failure . 
4. An alternative developmental strategy 
4.1. Alternatives: then and now 
An argument has been presented in this essay to the effect that it was ideological and 
economic radicalism that is the root cause of Russia ' s failure to avoid the large-scale 
economic disaster of the 1990s. The neo-liberal development strategy uncritically 
embraced by the shortsighted and self-interested Russian government has bankrupted the 
country' s economy and caused an unprecedented social decline. This paper has also 
argued that a moderate, social-democratic strategy based on traditions of mass social and 
economic creativity within the context of a genuinely democratic, socialized mixed 
economy could have been a better answer to the challenge of reforming the Soviet 
system. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, it was still possible to reform the country' s 
economy while retaining the major elements of a welfare state such as full or near-full 
employment, free health care and education, and a universal social safety net. 
Today, a decade since the neo-liberal paradigm was adopted by the Russian 
administration, the country is in a different condition, whereby some of the more 
progressive policy alternatives that were available and could have been adopted in the 
early 1990s cannot be afforded and thus are no longer an option. A welfare state with full 
or near-full employment, free health care and education and a comprehensive social 
safety net is simply out of reach for the bankrupt Russian economy ten years after the 
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initiation of the neoliberal reform. Does this mean that there is no place for an alternative 
economic strategy for contemporary Russia? Given that certain progressive elements of 
the socio-democratic model can no longer be afforded, the only way to overcome the 
recent trends of economic and social decline is to combine and apply progressive policy 
alternatives that are still within reach. Among such measures are policies aimed at 
preserving democracy and civil liberties, promoting the development of civil society and 
democratic institutions, giving priority to production and decriminalization, and reversing 
some of the most controversial economic decisions taken under the Y eltsin 
administration. Most importantly, the state must be reformed to become less corrupt and 
bureaucratic and more effective and competent; it must start playing an active role in 
economic recovery and long-term economic development. 
4. 2. The role of the state 
In the context of this discussion, it is instructive to consider the role of the nation-state in 
detail since the social democratic approach to reform places a strong emphasis on the 
concept of an activist state. Governments can stimulate, facilitate and support the 
development of competitive enterprises, as well as enhance the linkages between 
production, investment, trade, and technology. In Russia, however, no attempts have 
been made to influence the economy through the state' s activist policies. One of the 
country' s most fundamental problems is the weakness of the state; the government cannot 
even perform such essential functions as the enforcement of contracts or tax collection.151 
The state withdrawal has been driven by the decline in revenues and this retreat has been 
forced and unplanned; as such, it is a highly damaging process.152 Thus, "[t]he major 
151 Chrystia Freeland, "Not-so-badfellas," New Republic 10 December 1998: 18. 
152 Thane Gustafson, Capitalism Russian-Style (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 213-214. 
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threat is that the Russian state may well become weakened beyond repair, while its core 
functions are being privatized by illegitimate and unaccountable forces, including corrupt 
officials and organized crime." 153 
The question of the state' s role for transitional economies is an important one. 
The concept of extreme dominance of the state should, of course, be rejected; but it is 
now time to acknowledge that "in the contemporary world building a capitalist system 
requires an activist state role and a considerable period oftime."154 According to Stiglitz, 
"[t]here are certain areas of macro-economic management where central government-
initiated action should be the norm."155 
Traditionally, the state has a number of important economic functions . It provides 
essential infrastructural support, maintains order in society, establishes a set of economic 
policies, changes domestic economic arrangements in response to the changing demands 
of the world economy, provides necessary training for the labour force and so on.156 
Besides promoting economic growth, governments are also involved in the process of 
redistribution of resources through taxation and welfare plans and in other aspects of 
social development. 
There are only a very limited number of nation-states (if any at all) where 
governments do not interfere with the market; most present-day economies are mixed 
ones - a fact which implies that a certain degree of state intervention should not only be 
accepted but also encouraged. Therefore, most governments are involved in managing 
the national economies through regulations, policies, standards, and rules. Another 
important function of nation-states is development and implementation of a set of rules 
153 Reddaway and Glinski 3. 
154 Kotz, David. "Capitalist Collapse: How Russia Can Recover" Dollars and Sense, (Issue 220, 1998): 11. 
155 Stigilitz, "Whiter Reform? Ten Years of the Transition," 26. 
156 Alan Thomas, Poverty and Development in the 1990s, (Oxford University Press, 1992) 131, 132. 
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and policies to be adapted for international interactions. Governments sometimes protect 
domestic producers from international competition by trade controls that include tariffs, 
import quotas, subsidies, and licensing.157 There are a number of important roles- such 
as imposing order and collecting taxes - that only the state can perform. Moreover, 
"severely weakened states will encourage conflict, as they have in Africa, Central 
America, and elsewhere." 158 Sen argues that public policy is important for successful 
development strategy: 
.. . positive state activities have played quite a considerable part in the historical 
process of economic development. .. . In addition to favoring general economic 
development, any responsible state has to consider issues of equity and disparity.159 
Generally, the government is an institutional arrangement that compensates for market 
failures, provides public goods and deals with externality issues.160 According to Lall, 
.. . in theory, an active role may exist for governments to improve the functioning of 
markets. In practice, many governments have played just such a role, and gained 
unprecedented success for their countries as a result. 161 
While neo-liberal developmental strategy has recently advanced throughout most of the 
world, can we reasonably assume that state-minimizing policies have been closely 
followed by the world's leading economies? Judging from data on government spending, 
shown in Table 6 below, the state has never really abandoned its functions in the G-7 
countries even during the Reagan-Thatcher era, when the ideology of"laissez-faire" 
economics reached the peak of its popularity. 
157 Thomas 131 132 
158 Jessie Matth~ws, ;'Power Shift: The Rise of Global Civil Society," Foreign Affairs, (Jan/Feb 1997, Vol. 76):58. 
159 Amartya Sen, "What' s the Point of a Development Strategy?" Development Economics Research Programmed 
Paper, London School ofEconornics (April 1997): 4, 5. 
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Table 6. The role of the state: G-7 countries 




















During the period 1980 to 1996, social services and welfare payments alone averaged 25 
to 30 percent ofbudget in the G-7 countries.163 Furthermore, the state as a taxation agent 
collected 36.2 percent ofwages in taxes in 1978 and 38.7 percent ofthat in 1995.164 
Thus, both the levels of spending and taxation point out the fact that, minimalist rhetoric 
non-withstanding, the state continues to play an important role in the economies of the 
world's most economically developed countries. 
In light of the above analysis, it appears that the state plays a fundamental role in 
economic development in advanced and developing economies alike. A successful 
transition to a socially oriented market economy is nearly impossible to achieve in the 
absence of effective public institutions and a more activist role for the government. An 
economic model of this orientation would include the following essential features : a 
mixed economy representing both the private and the public sectors with strategic 
industries under public control; a coordinated macroeconomic policy on a national level; 
and a re-distribution policy aimed at providing a social safety net for those affected by 
162 The comparable figures for Russia are: 28 per cent of GDP in 1994; and 21.8 per cent of GDP in 1997. Sources: 
UNDP, Human Development Report 1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 222; The Economist, Pocket 
World in Figures: 1997 edition (London: Profile Books Ltd. , 1997) 178. 
163 Irving Michelman, The March to Capitalism in the Transition Countries (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998) 166. In 
contrast, total social spending in Russia has been only 12.6 per cent of GDP, as Table 3 shows. 
164 Taxes on wages for an average one-earner couple with two children in the G-7 countries; cited in Michelman, 166. 
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loss of income or other similar factors. 
The World Bank 's 1997 World Development Report has re-evaluated the Bank's 
earlier approach to the relationship between state institutions and developmental 
strategies for transitional and developing countries, turning from the concept of 
minimalist state to a "state-friendly" outlook. In a noteworthy modification of the Bank' s 
ideology, it was concluded that "[h]istory has shown that development requires an 
effective state. Stateless development as well as state-dominated development have 
failed . The state is central to economic and social development, not as a direct provider 
of growth but as a partner, catalyst, and facilitator."165 
4.3. Transition to an alternative developmental strategy 
In today' s interconnected world, a transition to a market economy in practice implies a 
wider process of integration with the global economy, with all the opportunities and 
challenges that such economic globalization presents. Thus, it is essential to consider 
how a transitional country can integrate into the global economy in the most optimal and 
beneficial way, at the same time reducing the associated risks. 
While the transitional and developing countries should attempt to integrate into 
the global economy, the retention of policy autonomy is essential to the success of such 
integration, as liberalization requires a new partnership between the state and industry. 
Both liberalization and integration should be implemented on a gradual basis; rapid 
integration ofthe LDCs in global markets often results in massive destruction of the 
national industries by international competition, as experiences of sub-Saharan African 
165 Leen Boer, "The State in a Changing World: World Development Report 1997," Third World Quarterly (Dec 97, 
Vol. 18, Issue 5): 935. 
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and some post-communist states show.166 
What is an appropriate policy response to the process of globalization for 
developing and transitional countries? It appears that there is no universal policy mix 
that could be applied to different national economies with equal success. It is clear, 
however, that an effective policy of adaptation of national conditions to global 
competition would include a long-term industrial policy, measures to protect domestic 
infant industries, correcting reliance on long-term domestic investment as opposed to 
short-term foreign investment, promotion of research and development, improvement of 
economic infrastructure and provision of a social safety net. 
In addition, governments should have the ability to create the necessary 
macroeconomic and market conditions in order to mobilize savings that can be 
transformed into long-term lending for enterprise development. Governments should 
retain enough policy autonomy in order to be able to reduce commercial, financial and 
investment risks associated with sharp tax increases, interest rate adjustments, or 
currency movements. 167 
Many observers agree that a larger role for the state in protecting domestic 
industry and correcting markets is needed if developing countries are to succeed in the 
global economy. Thus, Lall shows that there is convincing empirical evidence in favor of 
a "strong custodian role for the government. . (and] careful selective and functional 
interventions." 168 
According to Singh, developing countries should seek not a "close" but a 
166 John Sam, "Sub-Saharan Africa in Global Capitalism," An Independent Socialist Magazine, (JuVAug 99, Vol. 51 , 
Issue 3 ): 13. 
167 James Mittleman, "The Globalization Challenge: Surviving at the Margins," Third World Quarterly, (Sep. 94, Vol. 
15, Issue 3): 427. 
168 Lall 189. 
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"strategic" integration where the state plays an active role of not only that of a manager 
of a national economy, but also a mediator between the local and global economies. 169 
Singh argues that one of the key elements is an active industrial policy: 
... in mixed economy countries with reasonably effective states, the governments should 
pursue a dynamic industrial policy to bring about the desired structural transformations in 
the economy as speedily as possible, to achieve rapid economic growth.170 
While certain elements of globalization (such as export orientation and adoption of new 
technology) should be adopted, others should be rejected or reduced (short-term capital 
flows and dependence on borrowing from outside sources). According to Singh, industry 
protection, export promotion and performance standards are complementary policies that 
promote a strategic advantage over foreign competitors. Foreign direct investment 
should be discouraged, not encouraged, as the mainstream neo-liberal economic 
paradigm insists. Finally, governments should have an option to intervene by way of 
domestic price controls and by supporting their national technological systems. 
In a similar fashion, Rodrik argues that it is not the high degree of liberalization 
and integration that creates national economic growth; developing countries should adopt 
a set of policy responses to be able to successfully fit into the new global economic 
environment; according to Rodrik, "openness is [only] a part of development strategy; it 
does not substitute for it. " 171 Rodrik points out the unstable nature of the global 
economy that frequently produces large external shocks affecting national economies in 
an extremely negative way. A correct policy response to external shocks is critical for 
national governments of developing countries. A set of economic, social and political 
measures including the maintenance of a high rate of private and public domestic 
169 Ajit Singh, "Openness and the Market Friendly Approach to Development: Learning the Right Lessons from 
Development Experience," World Development (December, 1994) p. 1811-1823. 
170 Singh 1811 . 
171 Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work (Washington, D.C.: 
Overseas Development Council, 1999) 2. 
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investment, and the establishment of institutions that manage social conflict should 
provide economic stability, especially during times of global ' turbulence. ' 172 It is not 
trade or the degree of economic openness that matters; what really matters is economic 
growth: 
Governments and policy advisors alike have to stop thinking of international economic 
integration as an end in itself. Developing nations have to engage the world economy on 
their own terms, not on terms set by global markets or multilateral institutions.173 
Several case studies of countries belonging to the "Asian Miracle" group (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia) also seem to support an interventionist 
developmental model : 
A number of detailed academic studies of East Asia found that ' developmental' states 
had indeed played notable roles in shaping the direction and growth of their economies, 
through a broad array of regulatory institutions, market-guiding policies, and even 
protectionist support for national industries.174 
Governments ofEast Asian countries intervened heavily in all spheres oftheir economies 
during the periods of fast industrialization and at the same time avoided close integration 
with the world economy in the sphere of finance during their high growth phase. 
East and South East Asia, which were the only regions to escape stagnation or decline in 
the eighties, were led by countries whose defining characteristic was the fact that they 
protected and used their sovereign power to pursue national development strategies 
focusing on the creation of a strong national industrial and technological base, dense 
networks of domestic economic linkages, and relatively equal income distribution.175 
The general observations and conclusions cited above once again confirm that the set of 
policies chosen by the Russian administration has not been an adequate response to the 
challenge oftransition. An alternative strategy is the subject ofthe next section. 
172 Rodrik4-10. 
173 Rodrik 4. 
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4. 4. Policy options 
Outlined below are proposed policy options that may help to gradually overcome the 
economic and social difficulties present in Russia and described earlier. We have seen 
that these difficulties have been for the most part a product of an uncritical 
implementation ofthe neo-liberal developmental strategy in general and the almost total 
withdrawal of the state from the regulation of the national economy in particular. 176 It 
follows that the badly needed correction in the reform strategy must include there-
consideration of the role of the state as the top priority. Moreover, almost all of the 
proposed policy options will have to be either actively supported or implemented by the 
state apparatus. 
While it could be argued that the proposed measures aimed at strengthening the 
state apparatus run the risk of that state retreating into authoritarian, dictatorial and/or 
bureaucratic rule, such a risk is both justified and manageable. First, a capable and stable 
state with an efficient and de-politicized civil service has a better chance of eventually 
progressing toward a democratic, market-oriented and decentralized system of law and 
order as opposed to a situation where the state is weak, divided, and chaotic. Secondly, 
the above risk can be actively managed by taking measures aimed at improving the 
selection and qualifications of officials, eradicating corruption through more adequate 
levels of pay within the administration, and reducing staffing levels to a reasonable size. 
The authoritarian tendencies can also be counterbalanced by further developing 
institutions of representative democracy, in particular though achieving a better 
distribution of power between executive, legislative and judicial branches. 
The goal of this alternative policy proposal is to ensure the welfare and the 
176 Tikhomirov 259. 
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material well-being ofthe people through both enabling the economy to grow and 
introducing certain re-distributive measures. The means to achieve this goal are through 
implementing a set of policies that imply more reliance on the state and less on the 
market as a self-correcting agent. The policy recommendations fall into three categories : 
economic, social, and political. They are further grouped into short-term, medium-term 
and long-term measures in accordance with the expected time needed for the policies to 
be implemented and to take effect. The short-term policies represent the most urgent 
policy priorities that are, in effect, crisis management measures. Many ofthe polices 
placed in the medium-term and the long-term categories would require substantial levels 
of government spending and could be implemented only over a longer period of time due 
to present financial constraints. Thus, the short run measures can reasonably be 
implemented within 1-2 years; medium-run within 3-5 years; and long-run within 10 to 
20 years. The outlined measures are interdependent by nature and must be taken 
simultaneously in most cases. It is hoped that the short-term measures combined with the 
present favorable economic climate due to high world oil prices can set in motion a 
process of positive cumulative causation that will gather momentum for further rises in 
incomes, demand and investment. 
At this time, it is possible only to lay out the general recommendations. Given 
political and economic uncertainties, specific and more detailed recommendations are 
often not possible. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the general shape of recommendations is 
clear. The proposed measures may allow for a successful transition to a socially oriented 
market economy, initially creating the necessary pre-conditions for the stabilization of 
living standards, the gradual reduction of poverty and the income gap, and prevention of 
mass unemployment; and later leading to sustainable economic growth and social 
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stability. 
4. 4.1. Short-term policy options 
1. Temporary industrial protection 
The government should establish temporary protection of selected domestic industries 
and agricultural products in order to give national producers an opportunity to modernize 
and thus better compete with foreign firms. 
2. Capital controls 
A system that will control capital flows in and out of the country during the initial stage 
of the transition should be put in place. This will help stopping capital flight and will 
discourage dependency on short-term foreign loans. Closed capital accounts in China 
played a critical role in that country's economic success.177 
3. Reducing dependence on international financial institutions. 
Many observers, both Russian and Western, agree that IMF' s lending has been harmful to 
Russia's economy and national interests.178 According to one estimate, "at least a third of 
budget revenues are spent on the servicing and repayment of foreign debts."179 Thus, any 
new borrowing should be either significantly reduced or discontinued as soon as possible. 
This is entirely possible at the moment, since high global oil prices have been creating a 
budget surplus over the last two years. 
4. Better redistribution through better taxation. 
The flat rate taxation system currently in use does not provide for equitable distribution 
of resources and should be replaced with a well-enforced system of progressive taxation. 
177 Stiglitz as cited in Reddaway and Glinski, 303. 
178 See, for example, Nolan, Reddaway and Glinski, Chossudovsky, Sachs, and Bogomolov. 
179 Reddaway and Glinski 620. 
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Further, considering enterprises, Russia is a country of unpaid taxes.180 Taxes must be 
collected in a more aggressive way from enterprises that refuse to pay them. Enterprises 
that are not able to pay salaries and/or taxes must be re-privatized.181 Additional financial 
resources provided by a better system of tax collection should be directed towards the 
formal system of social support. 
5. Poverty Amelioration 
Due to the higher incidence of poverty among seniors and children, the lowest pensions 
need to be increased and additional benefits provided to single-parent families. 
6. Health Crisis Management 
Access to a basic package of health care benefits should be guaranteed to those currently 
unable to afford medical services. 
7. Promotion of food security for the poorest segments of the population 
Although Russia's economy was suffering from economic decline throughout the 1990's, 
it can be argued that the state has enough resources to provide a guarantee of a minimum 
nutritional intake (using, for example, a food stamp scheme) for those in need. 
8. Re-privatization 
Enterprises that were given away or sold for less than their true value must be either re-
privatized, or in some instances re-nationalized. This is especially important in regard to 
strategic asset industries such as transportation, energy, mineral extraction, and 
communications. The best mechanism to initiate this process is through judicial 
proceedings that will review the results of privatization where it is suspected a breach of 
the laws has taken place. 
180 Peter Boettke, "The Russian Crisis: Perils and Prospects for Post Soviet Transition," American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology (July 1999): 371 ; Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 223. 
181 Meaning that the enterprise owners who are unable to properly manage it must be forced into bankruptcy and their 
property auctioned off. 
51 
9. The introduction of a new social contract. 
While the old paternalistic social contract (which can be briefly formulated as, "Do what 
you are told and you will be taken care of') has been abandoned, there has been no 
consensus on what form the new social contract should take. This has led to a great deal 
of confusion in the Russian society as a whole.182 The new type of social contract should 
clearly outline the rights and responsibilities of both the general population and the 
government. The basic message could be elaborated along the following lines: "The 
government will assume the responsibilities of providing a safe environment free (as 
much as possible) of corruption and crime; and at least some minimum level of social 
safety net. The population will have to adjust to the new market realities and to work 
harder in order to succeed." In other words, the rules of the game should be made clear 
to both participating parties. 
4.4.2. Medium-term policy options 
10. Credit 
Credit should be provided at low cost for productive uses in industry, construction and 
agriculture, while steered away from financial speculation. 
11. Promotion of gender equity 
Empowerment of women by ensuring equal rights and access to land, credit, job and 
training opportunities, and political participation is essential for achieving both social 
stability and economic growth. The most urgent policy actions in regard to the gender 
issue are opening all occupations to qualified persons irrespective of gender, providing 
pro-active employment and entrepreneurship programs for women, and promoting the 
182 Braguinsky and Yav1insky 193,194. 
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provision of child-care facilities to improve the labour mobility of women.183 
12. Creation of a new, socially useful third sector in the economy 
This sector could provide goods and services that normally are not profitable in a free-
market economy. Most importantly, this publicly subsidized socially useful third sector 
will provide unemployed people with a source of income (however small that income 
might be) and will play an important social integration role by transforming people's 
lives though meaningful employment and social involvement. 184 
13. Judicial reform 
One of the main objectives of the process of democratic state-building includes the 
creation of a stable society ruled by law. In this context, one of the main challenges to a 
successful transition remains the weakness of legal institutions and mechanisms to 
regulate business and competition and to combat crime and corruption. 185 Thus, a judicial 
reform that would include the building or restructuring of legal institutions into a viable 
legal system is long overdue. The rule of law, separation of powers and an independent 
judiciary are vitally important for the development of an effective market economy. 
4.4.3. Long-term policy options 
14. Public Spending 
Public spending on science, technology, public health, and education should be gradually 
increased. Russia's financial loss from the decline of its science is estimated at $500-600 
billion annually.186 Investing in public health and education will in part result in a more 
183 Monica S. Fong, The Role of Women in Rebuilding the Russian Economy (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
1993) 14-18, 30. 
184 Alan Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology, and Democracy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) 99-103; Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1995) 239-243. 
185 Sakwa 65-72 
186 Reddaway and Glinski 3. 
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efficient and more competitive workforce. 
15. Poverty Reduction 
The disturbing trend of increasing poverty can be reversed if poverty reduction is to be 
given a higher priority on a national level. Fundamentally, one of the most important 
pre-conditions for poverty reduction is the determination to address the issue of poverty. 
A sustainable economic growth providing financial possibilities for boosting social 
expenditure is another such pre-condition. A long-term strategy aimed at mass poverty 
eradication should include the following elements: 
a) Increasing the guaranteed minimum wage level and old age pensions to the subsistence 
mtmmum; 
b) Eliminating errors in targeting. Studies indicate that while a significant proportion of 
the poor and the very poor do not receive any benefits from the government, households 
that are not poor often do receive public transfers.187 
c) Reinforcing social protection of disabled, elderly, children, and other categories not 
capable of active work. 
d) Securing support for persons who have lost their employment; introducing active 
programs aimed at helping unemployed to re-gain employment. 
e) Re-establishing a comprehensive public welfare system that can be jointly funded by 
the government, trade unions and large corporations and that would provide temporary 
support and protection for those who have fallen below the poverty line. 
16. Health Care and Education 
Essential health care and free elementary and secondary education must be guaranteed to 
all. The authorities should determine the content of a realistic package of health services 
187 Jeni Klugman and Jeanine Brathwaite, "Poverty in Russia during the Transition: An Overview," The World Bank 
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and establish the necessary procedures and responsibilities for providing these services. 
Responsibility for the elementary and secondary education system should be assumed by 
the state; this system to be entirely financed through tax revenue. 
17. Institutional development 
It is important to restore confidence in state-power and to enhance its regulatory role. 
Measures should be taken to make the state administrative apparatus more competent, 
democratic, efficient, predictable, accountable and transparent, while less corrupt and 
bureaucratic. The power of the state should be used for giving reforms a social 
orientation, stimulating domestic production, and pursuing structural and development 
policies. Structures of law, finance, and regulation appropriate to the new economic 
environment must be developed and strengthened. 
Promotion of the democratic system is essential; this includes free elections and 
constitutional changes to achieve a better balance of power among the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches. The state will also benefit from the devolution of 
power from federal to regional and local authorities. 188 The government should also 
pursue an active labour-market policy and stimulate entrepreneurship. 
18. Promotion of civil society 
Citizen participation and engagement in national policy-making must be encouraged as 
much as possible. Citizens' movements and campaign groups can and should 
democratically define and shape the country' s development path and policy priorities. 
Research Observer (February 1998): 44 . 
188 Braguinsky and Yav1insky 198. 
55 
A policy matrix summarizing the above policy options and further categorizing them into 
economic, social, and political measures follows . 
Table 7. Policy Action Matrix 
Economic Social Political 
Short-term 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6, 7 8, 9 
Medium-term 10 11 , 12 13 
Long-term 14 15, 16 17, 18 
5. Conclusion 
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Russian Federation was uniquely positioned for 
a successful transition to a mixed market economy with a social-democratic orientation. 
While under socialism there was huge underachievement in relation to human and 
physical resources, a large potential existed for well-designed institutional change to 
produce a substantial and lasting improvement in economic performance. Unfortunately, 
this potential has been wasted. Yeltsin ' s attempt to instantly replace a failed communist 
utopia with a new, equally utopian economic regime based on radical deregulation, 
privatization, and economic austerity led not to a rational and consistent transition, but to 
a decade of turbulence, political instability, economic decline, and hardship for the vast 
majority of the population. The nee-liberal developmental strategy, uncritically adopted 
by the incompetent and often self-interested Russian leadership, led to the collapse of the 
welfare state and left the government with few financial resources needed during the time 
of transition. Withdrawal of the state from the regulation of the national economy has 
had a profoundly negative impact on economic development. 
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I 
Thus, the central reason for the unsuccessful outcome of Russian economic 
reform has been a wrong policy choice. This project suggests an alternative set of policy 
options based on rational pragmatism and social-democratic values. The proposed 
strategy is based on the fundamental premise according to which the role of the state 
continues to be paramount in the ongoing development of democratic capitalism. 
Three generalized lessons may be derived from the Russian transitional 
experience. First, a policy of attempting to radically shift all the parameters of a national 
economy over a short period of time has a high likelihood of ending in failure . Second, a 
pragmatic, gradualist approach to reform based on a country' s needs, history, and stage of 
development is essential in designing a viable reform strategy. Third, institutional 
infrastructure and a coherent, effective state apparatus are necessary preconditions for 
both a successful transition to the market economy and sustainable economic growth. 
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